Yup, once again. Since today’s that date.

As an intermission: Would you know which is which, of the above/below …?
And then, there’s continental differences …

[Since it’s today’s date, I thought to flip it and not be original just for one day… nevertheless, the day deserves some sillyness in particular in current circumstances.]

First up, the Elk:
elk-06
Servus Canadensis, the wapiti indeed. Next up, the Elk:
130673480_moose_463656c
know as such in Eurasia including those tinny pebbles off the coast called the British Isles. Looks suspiciously like the Alces Alces that is the Canadian (oh well, and US, yes, whiners) Moose, doesn’t it?
Because it is…! But you moose’ent confuse the two with each other nor with the reindeer a.k.a. caribou:
reindeeris5
Rangifer Tarandus, since this one’s for Saami and Santa.

Are you feeling elky now ..? Or move to the Caribouan; you’ll never have problems with the above there … Oh deer we’re in seriousness-trouble here…

Navier-Stokes’y ML ..?

Just a question: Would anyone have a clue, or link – not the same thing Wink –, whether and how machine learning has been applied to provide a ‘solution’ or counter-example to the smoothness of 3D Navier-Stokes equations ..? As here, and here (and onward!) in particular.

Or …
Given the pattern of extreme sensitivity of starting parameters for the ‘outcome’ predictions of ‘full’ Navier-Stokes equations (for the moment abstracting away from this…), does this somehow mean that the ‘unpredictability’ of convergence of neural networks, is a neural network to be trained and started off with some random weight seeding maybe just a somewhatto a degree yet to be established on the range of 0-1 or 1-∞-simplified N-S equation ..? #askingforafriend of course.
The methodological congruities are just too beautiful to miss, and just think about how the ‘solution’ or heuristics achievements throughout the decades, might translate!

Just out of interest. In return:

[The clearness of the cuts helps, contrastingly; Strasbourg off some side street]

Random Carl on Strategy – II

Since the Internet exploded by the massive amount of requests sent to me [maybe not so much or ‘zero’ counts as such] herewith, in instalments, just some loose ends, parts, of Carl von Clausewitz’ Vom Kriege…
This time, a somewhat longer section but an important one for all in business, or in the business of organisation organisation; hence presented in parallel columns [pending cooperation of the browser et al.] yes it’s quite a longread but there will be a picture at the end when you get through all this:

Siebentes Kapitel: Friktion im Kriege
Solange man selbst den Krieg nicht kennt, begreift man nicht, wo die Schwierigkeiten der Sache liegen, von denen immer die Rede ist, und was eigentlich das Genie und die außerordentlichen Geisteskräfte zu tun haben, die vom Feldherrn gefordert werden. Alles erscheint so einfach, alle erforderlichen Kenntnisse erscheinen so flach, alle Kombinationen so unbedeutend, daß in Vergleichung damit uns die einfachste Aufgabe der höheren Mathematik mit einer gewissen wissenschaftlichen Würde imponiert. Wenn man aber den Krieg gesehen hat, wird alles begreiflich, und doch ist es äußerst schwer, dasjenige zu beschreiben, was diese Veränderung hervorbringt, diesen unsichtbaren und überall wirksamen Faktor zu nennen.
Es ist alles im Kriege sehr einfach, aber das Einfachste ist schwierig. Diese Schwierigkeiten häufen sich und bringen eine Friktion hervor, die sich niemand richtig vorstellt, der den Krieg nicht gesehen hat. Man denke sich einen Reisenden, der zwei Stationen am Ende seiner Tagereise noch gegen Abend zurückzulegen denkt, vier bis fünf Stunden mit Postpferden auf der Chaussee; es ist nichts. Nun kommt er auf der vorletzten Station an, findet keine oder schlechte Pferde, dann eine bergige Gegend, verdorbene Wege, es wird finstere Nacht, und er ist froh, die nächste Station nach vielen Mühseligkeiten erreicht zu haben und eine dürftige Unterkunft dort zu finden. So stimmt sich im Kriege durch den Einfluß unzähliger kleiner Umstände, die auf dem Papier nie gehörig in Betrachtung kommen können, alles herab, und man bleibt weit hinter dem Ziel. Ein mächtiger eiserner Wille überwindet diese Friktion, er zermalmt die Hindernisse, aber freilich die Maschine mit. Wir werden noch oft auf das Resultat kommen. Wie ein Obelisk, auf den die Hauptstraßen eines Ortes zugeführt sind, steht in der Mitte der Kriegskunst gebieterisch hervorragend der feste Wille eines stolzen Geistes.

Friktion ist der einzige Begriff, welcher dem ziemlich allgemein entspricht, was den wirklichen Krieg von dem auf dem Papier unterscheidet. Die militärische Maschine, die Armee und alles, was dazu gehört, ist im Grunde sehr einfach und scheint deswegen leicht zu handhaben. Aber man bedenke, daß kein Teil davon aus einem Stücke ist, daß alles aus Individuen zusammengesetzt ist, deren jedes seine eigene Friktion nach allen Seiten hin behält. Theoretisch klingt es ganz gut: der Chef des Bataillons ist verantwortlich für die Ausführung des gegebenen Befehls, und da das Bataillon durch die Disziplin zu einem Stück zusammengeleimt ist, der Chef aber ein Mann von anerkanntem Eifer sein muß, so dreht sich der Balken um einen eisernen Zapfen mit wenig Friktion. So aber ist es in der Wirklichkeit nicht, und alles, was die Vorstellung Übertriebenes und Unwahres hat, zeigt sich im Kriege auf der Stelle. Das Bataillon bleibt immer aus einer Anzahl Menschen zusammengesetzt, von denen, wenn der Zufall es will, der unbedeutendste imstande ist, einen Aufenthalt oder sonst eine Unregelmäßigkeit zu bewirken. Die Gefahren, welche der Krieg mit sich bringt, die körperlichen Anstrengungen, die er fordert, steigern das Übel so sehr, daß sie als die beträchtlichsten Ursachen desselben angesehen werden müssen.

Diese entsetzliche Friktion, die sich nicht wie in der Mechanik auf wenig Punkte konzentrieren läßt, ist deswegen überall im Kontakt mit dem Zufall und bringt dann Erscheinungen hervor, die sich gar nicht berechnen lassen, eben weil sie zum großen Teil dem Zufall angehören. Ein solcher Zufall ist z. B. das Wetter. Hier verhindert der Nebel, daß der Feind zu gehöriger Zeit entdeckt wird, daß ein Geschütz zur rechten Zeit schießt, daß eine Meldung den kommandierenden Offizier findet; dort der Regen, daß ein Bataillon ankommt, daß ein anderes zur rechten Zeit kommt, weil es statt drei vielleicht acht Stunden marschieren mußte, daß die Kavallerie wirksam einhauen kann, weil sie im tiefen Boden steckenbleibt usw.

Diese paar Detailzüge nur zur Deutlichkeit, und damit Verfasser und Leser zusammen bei der Sache bleiben, denn sonst ließen sich von solchen Schwierigkeiten ganze Bände voll schreiben. Um dies zu vermeiden und doch einen deutlichen Begriff von dem Heere kleiner Schwierigkeiten hervorzubringen, womit man im Kriege kämpft, möchten wir uns in Bildern erschöpfen, wenn wir nicht zu ermüden befürchteten. Aber ein paar werden uns auch diejenigen noch zugute halten, die uns längst verstanden haben.

Das Handeln im Kriege ist eine Bewegung im erschwerenden Mittel. Sowenig man imstande ist, im Wasser die natürlichste und einfachste Bewegung, das bloße Gehen, mit Leichtigkeit und Präzision zu tun, sowenig kann man im Kriege mit gewöhnlichen Kräften auch nur die Linie des Mittelmäßigen halten. Daher kommt es, daß der richtige Theoretiker wie ein Schwimmeister erscheint, der Bewegungen, die fürs Wasser nötig sind, auf dem Trocknen üben läßt, die denen grotesk und übertrieben vorkommen, die nicht an das Wasser denken; daher kommt es aber auch, daß Theoretiker, die selbst nie untergetaucht haben oder von ihren Erfahrungen nichts Allgemeines zu abstrahieren wissen, unpraktisch und selbst abgeschmackt sind, weil sie nur das lehren, was ein jeder kann – gehen.

Ferner: jeder Krieg ist reich an individuellen Erscheinungen, mithin ist jeder ein unbefahrenes Meer voll Klippen, die der Geist des Feldherrn ahnen kann, die aber sein Auge nie gesehen hat, und die er nun in dunkler Nacht umschiffen soll. Erhebt sich noch ein widriger Wind, d. h. erklärt sich noch irgendein großer Zufall gegen ihn, so ist die höchste Kunst, Geistesgegenwart und Anstrengung da nötig, wo dem Entfernten alles von selbst zu gehen scheint. Die Kenntnis dieser Friktion ist ein Hauptteil der oft gerühmten Kriegserfahrung, welche von einem guten General gefordert wird. Freilich ist der nicht der beste, der die größte Vorstellung davon hat, dem sie am meisten imponiert (dies gibt jene Klasse von ängstlichen Generalen, die unter den Erfahrenen so häufig zu finden sind), sondern der General muß sie kennen, um sie zu überwinden, wo dies möglich ist, und um nicht eine Präzision in den Wirkungen zu erwarten, die eben wegen dieser Friktion nicht möglich ist. – Man wird sie übrigens theoretisch nie ganz kennenlernen, und könnte man es, so würde jene Übung des Urteils immer noch fehlen, die man Takt nennt, und die allemal in einem Felde voll unendlich kleiner und mannigfaltiger Gegenstände nötiger ist als in großen entscheidenden Fällen, wo man mit sich und anderen Konzilium hält. So wie den Weltmann nur der fast zur Gewohnheit gewordene Takt seines Urteils immer passend sprechen, handeln und sich bewegen läßt, so wird nur der kriegserfahrene Offizier bei großen und kleinen Vorfällen, man möchte sagen bei jedem Pulsschlage des Krieges, immer passend entscheiden und bestimmen. Durch diese Erfahrung und Übung kommt ihm der Gedanke von selbst: das eine geht, das andere nicht. Er wird also nicht leicht in den Fall kommen, sich eine Blöße zu geben, was im Kriege, wenn es häufig geschieht, die Grundfeste des Vertrauens erschüttert und äußerst gefährlich ist.

Die Friktion, oder was hier so genannt ist, ist es also, welche das scheinbar Leichte schwer macht. Wir werden in der Folge noch oft auf diesen Gegenstand zurückkommen, und es wird dann auch klar werden, daß außer Erfahrung und einem starken Willen noch manche andere seltene Eigenschaften des Geistes zum ausgezeichneten Feldherrn erforderlich sind.”

Friction in War
As long as we have no personal knowledge of war, we cannot conceive where those difficulties lie of which so much is said, and what that genius, and those extraordinary mental powers required in a general have really to do. All appears so simple, all the requisite branches of knowledge appear so plain, all the combinations so unimportant, that, in comparison with them, the easiest problem in higher mathematics impresses us with a certain scientific dignity. But if we have seen war, all becomes intelligible; and still, after all, it is extremely difficult to describe what it is which brings about this change, to specify this invisible and completely efficient Factor.
Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a friction, which no man can imagine exactly who has not seen war. Suppose now a traveller, who, towards evening, expects to accomplish the two stages at the end of his day’s journey, four or five leagues, with post horses, on the high road—it is nothing. He arrives now at the last station but one, finds no horses, or very bad ones; then a hilly country, bad roads; it is a dark night, and he is glad when, after a great deal of trouble, he reaches the next station, and finds there some miserable accommodation. So in war, through the influence of an infinity of petty circumstances, which cannot properly be described on paper, things disappoint us, and we fall short of the mark. A powerful iron will overcomes this friction, it crushes the obstacles, but certainly the machine along with them. We shall often meet with this result. Like an obelisk, towards which the principal streets of a place converge, the strong will of a proud spirit, stands prominent and commanding, in the middle of the art of war.

Friction is the only conception which, in a general way, corresponds to that which distinguishes real war from war on paper. The military machine, the army and all belonging to it, is in fact simple; and appears, on this account, easy to manage. But let us reflect that no part of it is in one piece, that it is composed entirely of individuals, each of which keeps up its own friction in all directions. Theoretically all sounds very well; the commander of a battalion is responsible for the execution of the order given; and as the battalion by its discipline is glued together into one piece, and the chief must be a man of acknowledged zeal, the beam turns on an iron pin with little friction. But it is not so in reality, and all that is exaggerated and false in such a conception manifests itself at once in war. The battalion always remains composed of a number of men, of whom, if chance so wills, the most insignificant is able to occasion delay, and even irregularity. The danger which war brings with it, the bodily exertions which it requires, augment this evil so much, that they may be regarded as the greatest causes of it.

This enormous friction, which is not concentrated, as in mechanics, at a few points, is therefore everywhere brought into contact with chance, and thus facts take place upon which it was impossible to calculate, their chief origin being chance, As an instance of one such chance, take the weather. Here, the fog prevents the enemy from being discovered in time, a battery from firing at the right moment, a report from reaching the general; there, the rain prevents a battalion from arriving, another from reaching in right time, because, instead of three, it had to march perhaps eight hours; the cavalry from charging effectively because it is stuck fast in heavy ground.

These are only a few incidents of detail by way of elucidation, that the reader may be able to follow the author, for whole volumes might be written on these difficulties. To avoid this, and still to give a clear conception of the host of small difficulties to be contended with in war, we might go on heaping up illustrations, if we were not afraid of being tiresome. But those who have already comprehended us will permit us to add a few more.

Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium. Just as a man in water is unable to perform with ease and regularity the most natural and simplest movement, that of walking, so in war, with ordinary powers, one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity. This is the reason that the correct theorist is like a swimming master, who teaches on dry land movements which are required in the water, which must appear grotesque and ludicrous to those who forget about the water. This is also why theorists, who have never plunged in themselves, or who cannot deduce any generalities from their experience, are unpractical and even absurd, because they only teach what every one knows—how to walk.

Further, every war is rich in particular facts; while, at the same time, each is an unexplored sea, full of rocks, which the general may have a suspicion of, but which he has never seen with his eye, and round which, moreover, he must steer in the night. If a contrary wind also springs up, that is, if any great accidental event declares itself adverse to him, then the most consummate skill, presence of mind and energy, are required; whilst to those who only look on from a distance, all seems to proceed with the utmost ease. The knowledge of this friction is a chief part of that so often talked of, experience in war, which is required in a good general. Certainly, he is not the best general in whose mind it assumes the greatest dimensions, who is the most overawed by it (this includes that class of over-anxious generals, of whom there are so many amongst the experienced); but a general must be aware of it that he may overcome it, where that is possible; and that he may not expect a degree of precision in results which is impossible on account of this very friction. Besides, it can never be learnt theoretically; and if it could, there would still be wanting that experience of judgment which is called tact, and which is always more necessary in a field full of innumerable small and diversified objects, than in great and decisive cases, when one’s own judgment may be aided by consultation with others. Just as the man of the world, through tact of judgment which has become habit, speaks, acts, and moves only as suits the occasion, so the officer, experienced in war, will always, in great and small matters, at every pulsation of war as we may say, decide and determine suitably to the occasion. Through this experience and practice, the idea comes to his mind of itself, that so and so will not suit. And thus he will not easily place himself in a position by which he is compromised, which, if it often occurs in war, shakes all the foundations of confidence, and becomes extremely dangerous.

It is, therefore, this friction, or what is so termed here, which makes that which appears easy in war difficult in reality. As we proceed, we shall often meet with this subject again, and it will hereafter become plain that, besides experience and a strong will, there are still many other rare qualities of the mind required to make a man a consummate general.”

And there it is:


[Tourism turned into war ..? Barça of course]

Some loose ends around Times That are a’Changing

Some loose ends, today, since it’s my Special day.
Noticed that tweets like this and this actually align with what was predicted but only now, thirty (yes) years later, seems to get off the ground ..? Where the predictions / guidelines from fourty (yes) years ago, seem to have worked in reverse.

Society’s not doing well…

[Apart from the ‘fact’ that one shouldn’t strive for just one. Diversity in cultures is one of the main human values to be cherished globally → one should not mix all the world’s colours of local cultures, food&beverage specialties etc.etc. by having every food/beverage (sub)culture available just everywhere. Let’s keep off others’ lawns and all be ourselves, right? In particular, don’t impose such stupid blandification over all!
Apart also, the world is much, much poorer when such cultural unification would set in. … Oh.      Let’s just try to stop this development. Saves a lot of counter-aggression (not condoned at all but understood, observantly), wouldn’t it ..?
Apart also, too, recently I mentioned Ortega y Gasset here, who displayed a fear of death for such stupidity as one gets when trying to work on the common denominator of ever larger groups, which mathematically is closer to the greatest common divisor and tends to quickly drown to zero the larger the group gets. Hence ‘stupidity’, as History corroborates.]

Is it just me or is it, when (re)reading the above fourties-linked, that one feels sad that things haven’t turned out as they could have ..? For one thing, the developments from the Sixties were stopped in the Seventies, undone in the Eighties and Nineties plus a bit, then the little that remained of the memory, undone in the Naughties and certainly the decade that now closed. The only hope we have, is that this was the last roar of the dying lion of the Second Wave (thirties-linked), and for new generations to re-find he lost art of improving society. But what a totalitarian wave of structures to overcome! What a set-back from where we (?) were in the Sixties… Then, not without violence. Hopefully, now otherwise — but we learn from history … many things, among which: Freedom isn’t given/received, it’s pried from the dead hands of the oppressors – not!: the dead hands are from the common folk who went along out of apathy, the Leaders (not, but the string-pullers behind the scenes). Those that try to remain anonymous for a reason, and will denounce any personal accountability and will try to portray themselves as powerless and caught by the machinery – without merit.

Some more quote’lets from the Fourties-linked masterpiece

To be studied over and over again — which means not just copied!! But studied, and learned from not by heart. E.g., tactics. Not the strange coda about shareholders which has failed quite spectacularly one must conclude. And what worked then, almost certainly will not work now unless one understands that understanding is about the unspoken lessons not the direct ones.

“I remember … I made many moves almost intuitively. But when I was asked to explain what I had done and why, I had to come up with reasons. Reasons that were not present at the time. What I did at the time, I did because that was the thing to do’; it was the best thing to do, or it was the only thing to do. However, when pressed for reasons I had to start considering an intellectual scaffolding for my past actions – really, rationalizations. I can remember the ‘reasons’ being so convincing even to myself that I thought, ‘Why, of course, I did it for those reasons – I should have known that that was why I did it.” (pp.169-170) — How’zat, from someone who had a full life of making societal change, compared to the armchair produce-nothing-of-value’s that came up with some triangle …? What bereft-of-contribution-to-society leeches [still believing the blood letting that they do, is helpful ..??] still value their analyses over emergent wisdom ..? Never (really) worked a day of their lives, or a life of many decades on the barricades and in the boardrooms ..?
“The lesson here is that a major job of the organizer is to instantly develop the rationale for actions which have taken place by accident or impulsive anger. Lacking the rationale, the action becomes inexplicable to its participants and rapidly disintegrates into defeat.” (p.164) — The same, really. As if there already was a rationale (and if one studies the cases towards the previous quotes, one sees: also the motivation may be slim to none…) before the action was pulled off. With the Opportunity partially created, not fully found, by the way (or very much not so).
“The organizer must know and be sensitive to the shadows that surround him during his first days in the community. One of the shadows is that it is just about impossible for people to fully understand – much less adhere to – a totally new idea. The fear of change is, …, one of our deepest fears, and a new idea must be at least couched in the language of past ideas; often it must be, at first, diluted with the vestiges of the past.” (p.105) How is this not just a change management advice ..? And a very, very helpful one at that!
“He accepts the late Justice Learned Hand’s statement that ‘the mark of a free man is that ever-gnawing inner uncertainty as to whether or not he is right’.” (p.11) ‘And so on, and so forth’.
Yes there’s a straight 27 other poignant quotes I could give, but will stop here.

[Edited to add way before this post going live: This, and this — in Dutch, in the most wide-read newspaper usually focusing on raw sports not on anything near elitist debate…]

Not without giving you:

[The power from below, is more to be feared and less possible to counter…; Baltimore]

Random Carl on Strategy – I

Since the Internet exploded by the massive amount of requests sent to me [maybe not so much or ‘zero’ counts as such] herewith, in instalments, just some loose ends, parts, of Carl von Clausewitz’ Vom Kriege…:
Alle diese Theorieversuche sind nur in ihrem analytischen Teil als Fortschritte in dem Gebiet der Wahrheit zu betrachten, in dem synthetischen Teil aber, in ihren Vorschriften und Regeln, ganz unbrauchbar. Sie streben nach bestimmten Größen, während im Kriege alles unbestimmt ist und der Kalkül mit lauter veränderlichen Größen gemacht werden mußte. Sie richten die Betrachtung nur auf materielle Größen, während der ganze kriegerische Akt von geistigen Kräften und Wirkungen durchzogen ist. Sie betrachten nur die einseitige Tätigkeit, während der Krieg eine beständige
Wechselwirkung der gegenseitigen ist. Sie schließen das Genie von der Regel aus.

i.e.,
All these attempts at theory are only in their analytical part to be considered as progress in the province of truth; but in their synthetical part, in their precepts and rules, as quite unserviceable. They strive after determinate quantities, whilst in war all is undetermined, and the calculation has always to be made with purely varying quantities. They point the attention only upon material forces, while the whole military action is penetrated throughout by intelligent forces and their effects. They only pay regard to activity on one side, whilst war is a constant state of reciprocal action, the effects of which are mutual.

Which clearly, is Clausewitz’ position on latter-day claims of “AI” (quod non) as revealing some truths or theories that humans were too ignorant to detect; showing that they are statistical artifacts as long as no theory was driving the discovery, by deductive falsification attempts. Let alone that the world changes by the very application of the model…
But then, I might in theory take this too far. [Disclaimer: Yeah, yeah, I know for fact that I do; but not as far as your emotions would want so]

That was that. Onto the next itty bitty (incl polka dot) but first this:

[Battle yoga field; Bryant Park NT]

When Actor meets Opportunity, fraud sparks may fly

Too bad the ‘fraud triangle’ endures
Despite having been torn; down or to pieces, or whatev’… and some handy pages helping you out. To see that when you use those words often, they may not mean what you think they mean … [anyone see the pleonasm in this page its title ..?]

My take:

1. Time orders

The classical fraud triangle is presented as if all three factors may have to be present at any one (sic) time, to ‘have’ fraud committed. However, on even the slightliest closer inspection, one sees that this wasn’t in the original ideas. If you read the above first link, it will show that a. it was about social psychology; b. “for embezzlement to occur, there must be: 1) a non-sharable problem, 2) an opportunity for trust violation and 3) a set of rationalizations that define the behaviour as appropriate in a given situation. He [Sutherland, stealing (sic, ominously) from the inventor Donald Cressey … What 1. did he have to use his position (2.) and what 3. …? Oh of course, the 1. was pressure to publish and/or make a name; ed.] wrote that none of these elements alone would be sufficient to result in embezzlement; instead, all three elements must be present.“; c. it wasn’t about a triangle.

2. The focus on legalistic Act(ion)

The fraud triangle is near-always brought to bare when ‘fraud’ is in play, which invariably makes the case be stolen (sic) by legalistically inclined pundits that know of no ‘intent’ or such vaguenesses but want to deal with Actions only as the thing to sue against since the law knows (forbids) no psychology only the results in action(s).

Intermission
To focus only on the legal, only-actions-count kind of factors is somewhere on the bandwidth of naive – to -guilty-by-omission. Both ex ante, in the preventative work, and in the ex post, detective, corrective and (actor and victim) improvement work. But the legal angle does bring an interesting thing, being the demonstration in law that total security is a pipe dream and welcome to reality. Some countries have acts of law that make committing a crime a crime itself. Seems like breaking such a law either one goes down a Alice’ian rabbit hole of infinite recursion or Russell’s paradox is in play. Only demonstrating the sheer incompetence of some (the involved) lawmakers, that they fell for such a practical joke by their colleagues. We may hope. Turning the culprits [hey there they go ..!] into http errors 418 (Russell’s ones of that, too). If you now lost me in the subcultural references, join the club that will have nay already includes me…
End of intermission

This is not totally wrong but leaves the vast majority of anti-fraud work on the table. Since so much about what one can ‘do’ against fraud and its opportunities, lie within the realms of both (sic) the psychological side of things, and the operational side. As will be depicted below: Those are the two sides. There aren’t three.

3. Current approaches, mostly

Practically, most current approaches use an ORM lens to focus on Opportunity — with a handful of side initiatives (one per global organisation …!) also taking ‘awareness’ or ‘motivation’ into some consideration.

Intermission
As far as staff (bound to obey through livelihood dependence (however loosely or choke-tightly…) on continued employment – bondage isn’t just some peoples’ preference but mostly throughout humanity, what the masses revolt against) are sent to ‘training’ which psychologically is group punishment for individuals’ perceived faults and hence will backfire, or are ‘nudged’ i.e., brainwashed with surreptitious poster campaigns et al, which will backfire once people see that their minds are attempted to be corrupted (sic), such campaigns are at best window dressing which seems to be called ‘greenwashing’ nowadays for all forms of this. At worst, they backfire spectacularly into widespread counteractions. If you don’t trust me, a. I have zero reason to trust you, b. I will show you how I will out-master you in the take-what-you-can game ..! Yes when you go around basically suspecting all employees as a fraud risk, you’ll get the results you were nervous about much beyond your wildest dreams.
End of intermission

And this ORM side is oh so often badly, very badly executed. Remember the atrocities of “3 Lines of Defence” of yesteryears …? Your children will not believe you ever believed in that sh.t. Yes it’s bad; the closer one gets to those that pipe dream of their authority received through pursuing the kindergarten ‘logic’ (not) of 3LoD crossed [wanted to say: ‘squared’, but proper application of that would be beyond comprehension to the followers, fellow travellers] with lack of clue about how meshes of control objectives and controls, are not effective at all. Improvements have been proposed, but are hardly even noticed.

4. Actors; they act – some part, some role

A lot of time, a lot of insightful stuff regarding employees is apparently missed. Even when from a Master, who finds his masterpiece (among a number…) apparently ignored by the vast majority of the ones that should par excellence have memorised the messages from it. Which can most partially be summed up by the following:

and would include reference to:

plus, one could throw in a picture on Knowledge–Attitude–Behaviour–et al:

From which one can deduce [c’mon, it’s hardly hard ..!] that there’s much more to life than just rote work, robot-style “compliance” (quod non), and that you’d better know and use that others do care about more than your petty little behavioural expectations. They bring in the money, not you… (?)
By the way; the actors are ‘always’ present — at least their internals (as above) are, 24/7 so you better deal with that also on a somewhat more continuous basis than the annual let-the-secretary-click-the-right-answers-for-you online “training” thingy.

5. Opportunity and the ORM pastiche

As if the stuff you have in pace, would or even could work. Dependent as you are on heat map reports … I need not say more on the subject than before, over and over again (apart from this link-summary) or dwell on the Controls issue that would take libraries to get out of your cargo cult systems [yes you are this primitive…!!]…, or it would be that there’s news in this town; a sort of Christmas gift move to the blindsided.
In short [not]: What you have today, in terms of risk management (or even only ~analysis) or ‘(sets of) controls’, is a shambles to put it as mildly as one can. Being ignored by the ‘1st line’ for the actual RM1 and RM2 in particular, shows they see the folly of the whole 3LoD thinking with the fooly (sic yes I made that an expression by using it) of the 2nd line above all. Just be happy you’re ignored, can continue to reap the budgets that you do [hint: any budget not well spent is a direct write-off loss so maybe not complain for not getting enough as you might poke up a sleeping bear…] and are tolerated for stupid-compliance reasons only.
And note that in the overall fraud threesome [the originals never made it a triangle, that was for those who didn’t quite ‘got it’ in order to impostorsyndrome themselves out of it with a Powerpoint pic avant la lettre], Opportunity seems to be something that normally isn’t there but suddenly presents itself. [Motivation and Rationalisation are apparently considered to be present for much longer, as they need ‘preparation time’ to mature to a usable (sic) level when called upon by the sudden appearance of the O.] Which is contrary to everyday business operations of course. Which is also where one would start to fix things but see that countering the psycho half (sicn) is as much a part of daily ops [so, not ever project-based – though 15, 29 and 32 of this] as daily ‘controls’-compliance ops / ORM is.

Grande Finale

What to do, then …?

    1. Do some serious (O)RM [almost all RM is O-RM ..!!], that on the Threat side deals, aside from Acts of Nature and Acts of Man – Unconscious/accidental-style, also with Acts of Man – opportunistic-threat stuff. Plus, includes the ‘risk management’ done at the Actor side (like here). And, works through a portfolio management framework like here. Even including this, preferably, to bring down resistance which so far is far from futile [or it wouldn’t have existed anymore; see how total-society-uprooting-threatening your current approaches by the responses seem to have been]. Realise, too, that each and every ‘control’ introduced, brings new vulnerabilities and maybe you’ve gone beyond the optimal already and create more vulns than you ‘solve’.
    2. Do all the things against the Actors, permanently. ‘Against’ as in: Not distrust everyone as Guilty until (like, never) proven innocent, but the other way around — facilitate freedom until your pension [a number of latter-day links to papers in/of e.g., HBR, McK (if one can still trust them now they’re so exposed as required-results-report-for-sale cheapos), Quartz, Longreads, Medium, Tilda et al bring a bit of news to this scene; study the definitive materials as they can help from Old School / 2nd-Wave and counterculture-anarchy [not quite so much, if you study that link ..!!] organisational frameworks clashes to synthesis into the 3rd Wave ideal form of the future mixing needs and freedom in suitable mixes].
      See, this should have been in place all along. Conclude that you brought about fraud by your own ‘leadership’ [don’t get me started on that oh now you did! See: I meant lack of…] of micromanagement which is your only resort when all else, like any true understanding of ‘management‘, wasn’t present. Also, take note of this, and realise that diverstity in your organisation doesn’t (only) increase diversity in threats but much more increases chances that deviations get noticed; if all eyes look at/for the same things they’ll miss most of the important (sic) deviations but when the focuses and angles differ, full coverage comes much closer much easier, automaticallier ;-/ just like two antimalware scanners cover more than one.
    3. Use all the new info you can get your hands on [for a start: the above links and where they lead you; should I add: in particular when off this blog…], and throw in some elaborate program on the quantitative side (Nassim Taleb, Vose, to name two ends to a scale) but also on the cultural side (these here couple of pundits (huh) provide a nice introduction and some links-from) — and continue to use the stuff you’ve interpreted from the above pics on how people work, internally. Let’s also include phrases like ‘Monte Carlo simulations, tornado charts et al.’; ‘AI/ML for modelling, visual-, text- and speech- semantical processing, prediction, and outlier detection’ in the mix. Any suggestions of what may be added here?

Anyway. Let’s just not talk of ‘fraud’ triangles ever again, ‘kay ..?

Now, finally, for your viewing pleasure:
[Strategy (which is execution, as in this) and detail a beautiful picture makes; Hilversum]

Bam! Goner.

No, not fireworks.
Because of joining a reputable consultancy, I’ll be posting much less frequently from now on. This is more about saying Thanks for all your attention [and not for all your not so much, yes I keep track which at these slim-to-none figures is easy], so long and thanks for all the fish, and See You Soon.


[To construct more elaborate ideas and stories; Calatrava’s Science museum, Valencia]

Meddle Managers

OK, an integration of very old material with some new stuff:
The things from the past being about how, in frequent swirls of comments and rants against ‘middle’ managers, there were two responses from my side: 1. Yes, they are, often (I), of the worst kind and that qualification has no Dutch connotation involved here; 2. No, they’re valuable and have a serious, very serious role to play, if they play it right like often (II) happens. This sort of discussion you can read back through my posts here.

Sure, there was, and is, much to improve qua meddling management. Take for example the span of control … When well-balanced, there’s insufficient time/room to micro-manage (or the one doing it will burn out; Darwinian selection) and there’s no blow-out due to overstretch (him again).
Or take the many strands on Leadership on the one hand and Supportive, Facilitating Foremen on the other. Like, this recent piece, in a way [read hard and you’ll find the way by the way], or this even further-reaching vista.

Now, we’re all eagerly awaiting Kristel Thieme‘s follow-on posts …

The three together, would make quite a case for management in the right way, right ..?

Net up, the Spanish Inquisition. First, still:

[I’ve been told that fat back sides are still in fashion. Why …!?!? as they are ugly as s…; this, in Amsterdam harbour (6th of Europe, still..?)]

Rules, rules, rules Must Be. …?

A collection again of various viewpoints into one Idea [not to be pronounced like the construction kit company Eye-kja], in a collate-yourself fashion:

Part one, being yesterday’s post as here.
Coupled to, hey did I write it that early already how hopeful I was … this golden oldie.

And some quotexts:
Eric Hultgren stated in a post that “Its still amazing to me that most of our organizational rules and practices (eg. time reporting, hierarchical reporting, performance management, budgeting, vacation approval etc.) are based on that a few people would misbehave if rules and practices were not there. Would it not make more sense to have organizational rules and practices that would fit the absolute majority of the people instead?
to which Jad Nohra commented: “When something seems amazing, it’s usually because there is a hidden reason which, when understood, makes it seem much less amazing. In this case:
No it’s not amazing, because the rules and practices are not written for the sake of any people in the organization, but sadly, they are written there mostly for the organization to be able to claim they have rules, and forward the blame to individuals in case of misbehavior. This is the main reason for these rules to exist.

Which both is to be linked to the respective chapters of Bruce Schneier’s much too much overlooked work in this field.

In the end … most of you will go this or that.
Whatever …?? And:

[Odd, qua style, I’m unsure what to make of it – consistent, different, probably works for the inside and maybe the outside but overall? Utrecht Papendorp]

Group ethics

Individuals can be ethical, groups not so much.” — as a conclusion of this insightful piece.
At which, immediately my Canetti and Ortega y Gasset antennas went off the charts.

And with the note of the ‘can’ in the above — not so much the petty little bureacrats with their mostly mumbo-jumbo about cold fusion 3LoD farrago [yes just look that up will you]. They are too hopelessly caught up in their view to consider the im- or rather anti-moral ramifications of the wrong understanding of the idea.

Also rather, an onward discussion would involve solving the trolley problem and knowing-plus-beyond-that-understanding one’s own position anyway, as in this nifty test, brutally biased in utilitarianism. Yes, that’s a pejorative if ever there is one.

Still, I’d like to leave it here now with an even more positive note; hard but not impossible …:
Can we bridge the gap between semantic levels, i.e., grasp the jump from mere knowledge to understanding and insight, the jump from personal data to privacy, etc. ..? Noting that there’s aggregation at work (Ortega y G again) plus an interesting notion of ‘emergent properties‘. Unsure whether e.g., psychology/psychosociology/sociology [my browser spell (huh, ‘spelling’ but the abbreviation is better when dealing with browser ‘security’, eh?) checker intersects ‘psychopathology’, appropriately] would have some clear enough takes on that one ..! The jump from psycho to socio I mean.
If we can get a grip on these kinds of jumps, we for certain be able to build better brains — moving from plain ML to symbolic reasoning and vice versa or rather, in full brain-copying cooperation. Capice ..? Also, we’d better be able to do something about/with ethics.

After which:

[Time to pond(er); Alhambra Granada]