Ah. Actually, I needed a well-ordered list of the subset of my posts re All Against All. Because searches don’t pony up the rightly ordered results, herewith for future reference:
So… Done. For you:
[Well-calculated dare, Madrid]
Tag: IT security
SwDIoT
Recently, there was yet another exepelainificationing of ‘software defined networking’, along the lines of separation of the control plane from the data/content plane (here).
Which ties into a core problem, with IoT the subject of this post: Integrity.
Yes, confidentiality may be an issue, but singular raw data points themselves often are too granular to actually steal any information from. And Availability is of course also of the essence, especially in ‘critical’ systems. But te main point of concern is with Integrity, of the system in a wider sense, but also in the smallest sense.
Take Stux … Integrity breach as the vector space, spanned along a great number of dimensions.
Objective: Degradation of the information value; increasing the variance to a level where noise overwhelms the R2 of the signal (however far from log2(n), big if you understand), through degradation of the (well, original) software integrity.
Path: Introduction of intentionally-faulty (?) software. With use of of, probably, penny-wise correct IAM, being pound-foolish at the medium level. I mean, the level where human and other actors are unwitting accomplices in planting da bomb. That’s what you get by simpleton top-down compliance with just about every thinkable rule: To do any work, underlings will devise ways to circumvent them. And, adversaries will find, see, avenues (that wide) for riding on the backs of the faithfully compliant to still achieve the objective.
But OK, back to … separating the control plane from the data plane. Bringing a shift in efforts to disrupt (no, not of the mehhhh!! destructive, economy-impoverishing kind but in the actual signal degradation kind) from just-about any attack plane down to, mostly, the control plane. That may seem like an improvement, de-messing the picture. But it also means shifting from a general, overall view of vulnerabilities to the core, and a core which is less tested or understood, and harder to monitor and correct, than previously. Or is it ..?
So, if we take this Software Defined to IoT, we’ll have to be careful, very careful. But yes, IoT is constructed that way … With signals to actuators that will result in altered sensor data feedback. Know the actuator signals, and the actuator-to-sensor formulas (!), and you’re good to go towards full control, with good or bad (take-over) intent. Know either (or how to get into the sensor data stream), and at least you can destroy integrity and hence reliability. [DoS-blowing the signal away in total blockade or grey noise wipe-out, and your cover is blown as well. Is a single-shot or semi; you may want to have full-auto with the best silencer available…]
Hm, the above from the tinkering with the grand IoTAuditing framework promised… To turn this all into a risk managed approach. Well, for now I’ll leave you with:
[It has a glass floor up in there, you know. Blue Jays territory, ON – and yes, a very much sufficiently true and fair horizontal/vertical view picture, according to accountants]
You(‘)r(e) right(s)
Well, whatever percentages in this; Voltaire was right. Even if there would be just one citizen who’d think otherwise, all others should (also) defend his (her?) right to be wrong, to the death.
As it’s already five o’clock (here), have a nice weekend, with:
[Not quite St.Pat’s Day material, still quite equivalent of the Green … Frankenmuth, MI]
All against all, part 6; loose ends
OK, herewith the final-for-now Part VI of the All Against All matrix-wise attack/defense analysis labeling. This time, about tactical content of … mostly, the defense matrix of edition IV.
Where I wanted to do a full-scope in-depth analysis of all the cells of Matrix IV. Not the sequel but the actual original defense posture strategy matrix. Because that was put together in a straightforward sloppy way anyway.
But then… I wanted to detail each and every cell according to this here scheme:
After further analysis along the lines of this here approach:
but mixing that quite hard, according to this previous post of mine (certainly the links contained therein, too) and a great many others contra bureaucratic approaches… but also mixing in the guidance of (not stupid compliance with!) the new one that at last, has quite some ‘user’ involvement in it. But still is based on both the top-down and the step-by-step fallacies a bit too much.
But it’s late and I don’t feel like the tons of effort involved. Yet. Maybe in a future enormous series of posts …
And should include references to OSSTMM here, too. Because al of the above, in the super-mix, will have to be checked and sensitized (is that the word for checking that it all makes sense?). Short of the word ‘audit’ where the respective profession (a trade, it is… at most, a role) has let us down so much. If only by the kindergarten zeal about ‘governance’ and ‘value’ – phrases so hollow (or circularly defined) that they’re not worth the ink (light) they’re written with, when used in the auditors’ contexts.
So, OSSTMM may help. By inspection where the rubber meets the road. And fixing whatever needed to be. Duct taping the last few bits, where the beautifully AutoCADded [anyone remember what that was (for)!?] frameworks failed in the machine milling. Or 3D printing, or whatev’, due to design failures due to requirements failures due to failures in common reason at the upper levels…
Now, with all the all against all posts (1 to 6 indeed), would you be able to advise Sony, and the others, how to be better protected ..? You should. Or re-read the whole shazam until you do…
After all of which you deserve:
[Cologne, of the massive kind]
All against all, part 5; discussion
OK, herewith Part V of the All Against All matrix-wise attack/defense analysis labeling. Let’s call it that, then.
Where the big move in the matrix is, of course, from the top left half towards the bottom right half. Where there’s a continuation of politics by other means. At a grander scale, the analysis (or is it synthesis..?) turns to:
- The resurgence of, let’s call it, Digital Arms’ Race Cost Competition / Collapse. Just like the old days, where economic and innovation attrition was attempted by both sides of the Cold War. Including the occasional runaway tit-for-tat innovation races and some flipping as well. Yes, all the mix applies.
- The analysis that the world (yes, all of it) over the decades and centuries seems to bounce on a scale between a bipolar 2-giant-block stand-off on one hand, and a 1 giant versus multiple/many opponents on the other. Like, Europe has oscillated between such positions over the centuries. And took them global by enlisting their youngest sibling (as Baldr to the rescue), the half-god saving the others from Ragnarök, the USofA – against the hordes from the East as predicted by our dear friend Nostra da Mus (remember? though he had a diferent view on the ideology involved…) In Da House. Now that the global stand-off had reached the DARC stage, we see a multi-opponent scheming and chessplaying once again. USofA, EU still somewhat attached but …, Russia and Friends, China, India, Brasil and friends, a host of semi-independents in the East and Far-East, and in the Middle-East (what’s with the Middle, if centers of power gravity change and disperse so quickly?).
Edited to add: This Attali post, basically delineating the same. - As usual throughout human history, it’s the underlings and meek dependents all throughout the top left three quarters of the matrix that are war zones and battle grounds, too, suffering and being sacrificed as pawns without too much share of the spoils, profits, trophies and laurels. For the skirmishes and all-out war’lets as the 20th century shows.
- Still somewhat ethics-bound players (e.g., “democratic” (quod non) countries) will also have to fight internally, for legitimacy of their ulterior objectives (externally, internally), strategies, tactics and operational collateral damage. Which in turn binds them down tremendously, when up against less scrupulous players. Don’t wrestle with pigs because you both get dirty and the pigs love that. Unless of course you’re fighting over the through’s contents for survival. And you have one hand tied behind your back, internally, while fighting for the greater good of all, externally.
So far, so good. Much more could be said on the above, but doesn’t necessarily have to. Because you can think for yourselves and form your own opinions and extensions to the above storylines, don’t you?
Still to come: (probably the 18th) a somewhat more in-depth view on the matrix of part V, going deeper into the defense palette.
And indeed, I’m still not sure this all will lead anywhere other than a vocabulary and classification for Attribution. But I see light; an inkling that actually there may be value and progress through this analysis …
After all of which you deserve:
[Grand hall of the burghers. I.e., the 0,1% …; Brugge again]
All against all, part 4
OK, herewith Part IV of:
Tinkering with some research that came out recently, and sometime(s) earlier, I had the idea that qua fraud, or rather ‘Cyber’threat analysis (#ditchcyber!), some development of models was warranted, as the discourse is dispersing into desparately disparate ways.
The usual picture suspect:
[Mock defense, open for business at Brugge]
Second up, as said: The same matrix of actor threats, (actor) defenders, but this time not with the success chances or typifications or (read horizontally) the motivations, or typical strategy-level attack vectors, but basic, strategy-level defense modes. Not too much detail, no, but that would not be possible or the matrix would get clogged with all the great many tactical approaches. Those, laterrrrr…
Next up (probably the 16th) will be a discussion of movements through the matrix, matrices (by taking both the blue and the red pill; who didn’t see that option ..?), for state actor levels. And (probably the 18th) a somewhat more in-depth view on the above matrix.
Hmmm, still not sure this all will lead anywhere other than a vocabulary and classification for Attribution (as in this piece). But I see light; an inkling that actually there may be value and progress through this analysis …
All against all, part 3
OK, herewith Part III of:
Tinkering with some research that came out recently, and sometime(s) earlier, I had the idea that qua fraud, or rather ‘Cyber’threat analysis (#ditchcyber!), some development of models was warranted, as the discourse is dispersing into desparately disparate ways.
The usual picture suspect:
[What no throwback to the socialisixties ..?]
Second up, as said: The same matrix of actor threats, (actor) defenders, but this time not with the success chances or typifications or (read horizontally) the motivations, but with typical strategy-level attack vectors. Not too much detail, no, but that would not be possible or the matrix would get clogged with all the great many tactical approaches (including social engineering, spear phishing, etc.etc.).
Next up (probably the 12th) will be typical countermeasure classes.
Hmmm, still not sure this all will lead anywhere other than a vocabulary and classification for Attribution (as in this piece). But I see light; an inkling that actually there may be value and progress through this analysis …
New car game, new chances
Earlier we wrote about how the self-driving cars till now, weren’t. Were more like ‘world-map programmed in, some (humanity oh dear how irrational) noise added’-navigating cars.
Now, we’ve entered new games, like the Big G possibly taking on Uber through employing self-driving cars – which would make the shrill reality of jobless growth, as predicted for the taxi industry a reality; where do all the taxi drivers go ..? And suddenly, there’s a new entrant on the other front. This one might pear fruit. If, big if, they’ve tackled the hard AI problems XOR they’re on the same lame track. [As said, the essence in this earlier post]
Or it’s just an as yet unheard of thingy for a new round of Connected Car developments. Or…
And then there’s dark horses lurking in the background. Like Tesla (/ Hyperloop?), and others you have no idea about yet.
OK, speculation, speculation, … Just wanted to note that there seems to be movement on the AI front leaking into the Real World. Or not. But there’s things a-brewin’.
[Cloudy weather, dark picture. Still, let’s pray for progress ? at Colline du Haute]
Repudiation, repudiation (not) everywhere
With DARPA’s quest for Active Authentication (as here), what will the future spread of (non-)repudiation look like ..? By means of strength of proof e.g. before courts, when system abusers may claim to accidentally have the same behavioural ICT use patterns as the unknown culprits, or be victims of replay attacks.
I’m unsure about how this will play out, then; whether Innocent Until, or Proof of Innocence, or even Reasonable Suspicion may still exist.
Yeah, I get it – you’ll claim that this is for DoD purposes only. Of course, as it never has, in the past. @SwiftOnSecurity would (need to) be on the alert.
Well, as this kind of innovation (by this agency) usually reaches society in all sorts of very unexpected ways, there’s hope that something in support of the Constitution may in the end come out… for now, I’ll leave you with:
[Light on the inside, though without outlook… FLlW at Racine, WI]
IR-L or 0 (BC)
The spectre of BCM has been haunting ‘business’ departments of about any organization for too long. It needs to go away – as spectre, and take its rightful place in ‘Risk’ ‘Management’. The latter, in quotes, since this, this, this, this, and this and this.
Much link, very tire. Hence,
[Opera! Opera! Cala at Vale]
Which actually brings me to the core message: ‘Governance’ [for the quotes, see the last of the above link series again] fails for a fact (past, current, future) if it doesn’t include risk management, and when that doesn’t take this into account:
[Here, highlighted for InfoSec as that’s in my trade portfolio…]
First, a reference to that RM-in-Gov’ce mumbo jumbo: Here. (In Dutch, by way of crypto-defeating measure vis-à-vis TLAs… (?)) Listing among others (diversity, sustainable enterprise, external auditor role) the need to do more about risk management at ‘governance’ levels. Which might of course be true, and how long overdue after COSO has been issued and has been revised over and over again already.
But then, implementation … No strategic plan survives first contact with the enemy (ref here). And then, on turf are the wars that be, in all organisations. Among the great multitude of front lines, the one between Information Risk (management) the Light brigade [of which the Charge wasn’t stupid! It almost succeeded but because the commander wasn’t a toff so supporting a brilliant move by such an upstart wasn’t fashionable, he was blamed – an important life lesson…], being overall generic CIA with letting A slip too easily on the one hand, and the all too often almost Zero Business Continuity (management) on the other, outs the lack of neutral overlordship over these viceroys by wise (sic) understanding of risk management at the highest organizational levels. As in the picture: It’s all RM in one way or another. And (though the pic has an InfoSec focus) it’s not only about ICT, it’s about People as well. As we have duly dissed the ‘Process’ thinghy as unworthy hot air in a great many previous posts.
Where’s this going …? I don’t know. Just wanted to say that the IR-to-BC border is shifting, as IR becomes such an overwhelming issue that even the drinks at Davos were spoilt over concerns re this (as clearly, here). But still, BC isn’t taken as the integral part of Be Prepared that any business leader, entrepreneur or ‘executive’ (almost as dismal as ‘manager’) should have in daily (…) training schedules. Apart from the Boy Cried Wolf and overly shrill voices now heard, the groundswell is (to be taken! also) serious: IR will drive much of BC, it’s just that, again, sigh, the B will be too brainless to understand the C concerns. Leaving BC separate and unimplemented (fully XOR not!) next to great ICT Continuity.
Or will they, for once, cooperate and cover the vast no-man’s land ..? Hope to hear your success stories.
