Infosec – Maverisk / Étoiles du Nord

Another nail (to images as evidence)

Just to drop it here, after umptuous [now that I’ve used it, when not if that’s a word] warnings, another nail to the … value of ‘evidence’ in court, in this piece, explained in easy pics here. Seriously distorting the picture by seemingly doing nothing of the sort. Ocean’s Eleven (or –and counting) style vid replay, now with much more modern, more perfect options.

[Edited to add: Another case in point here]

Just sayin’. And:
[When Run To The Hills is your last defence; Salzb’ – with a terrace]

There we have it; botcracy

As we turn the leaf towards a new year, let’s not forget what values – in operation, operationalised – protect our Human Rights, in the form of de-mock-racy, and how they are ever so quickly being repelled by, e.g., AI and fake news but in particular, the deployment of bots as here.
Yes I know, that’s three layers of tools but still, the focus is on the first two but the latter plays almost the foulest role.
Yes I know, the ‘operationalised’ part may need elucidation on the side of ‘transparency’, ‘access and inclusion’ etc., but when you read after the link, you’ll understand that the issue is society-wide, not just FCC / net-neutrality.

Well, that was a quicky… hence:
[München, for zero (as in: 0.0) reason]

Unsider threats

How is it that we tend to hear over and over again about ‘insider’ threats ..?
Even when it’s not the Board that is meant here, as the pinnacle of … the ability to drive a company into the ground, those pesky ‘insiders’ really are a pain in the place where you like that or the sun doesn’t shine.
Better get rid of any and all of those ‘insiders’ then, eh ..? AI here you come. But if AI system(s) would be a replacement for humans, wouldn’t they commit the same temporary, small, innocious and unconscious lapses of judgement..?
And what about off-boarding the biggest threats first ..? [Where I do men the above committee]

Maybe better to recall that we’re about to celebrate the fifteenth birthday [was there ..!] of deperimetrisation – with an s once you recognise its country of birth, and disclaim an all-out stupid Jabba the Hutt style claim of origin so no z’s anywhere – who’s an -sider when there’s no way to tell ..?

Also, it villifies the underlings that make your salaries and bonuses so if you punish them (by giving them less reward than yourself), they don’t get mad. They get even. Simple. ~~You gave them the tools~~ You made them build their own tools superficially to keep you afloat but you wouldn’t recognise a buoy from an anchor so guess what you get… And when you’ve lost them, they aren’t much of the insider you’d want, right; morally they’d be on the outside again already.
Case in point: This miss by the venerable @HarvardBiz … Though the solutions offered, are valid – as very-starting points…

So Part I – Ω is to treat your underlings like you care. If, big if, you actually mean it (hence will not in an instant be found out to be a fraud at this), you’re saved for now. Otherwise, no fight against <whatever>sider threats, will be futile. Remember this ..? You get treated like you treat, it starts with you – your intentions towards the other, will be perceived. Positive/negative, the choice is yours.

Oh well. Plus:
[Some light’s also good for the inside; Utrecht (1924 ..!)]

Now you read me, now you don’t

As a pointer to what this is about…
You know, like the oldest tricks in the book, still going strong when all the world’s (worlds’?) arms’ races are going nowhere. As predicted. Where the title of course doesn’t reference a major part of the sec controls, stego.

But that’s a finesse point. Let’s be happy that research into faster horses continues, with results.

CU!
[Stylish; what’s hiding here ..? Even when you know where]

Toepasselijke infosec

Hoe is ook anders te verwachten van een museale aangelegenheid, dan dat deze als wachtwoord minimaal 6 characters waarvan 1 hoofdletter en 1 special character eist, in tijden dat al tijden duidelijk is dat dit a. onder het vroegere, ooit-eens regime al irrelevant zwak was b. door de NIST-paper(s?) allang achterhaald is. En mijn passphrase is er natuurlijk nevernooit in te vrotten – de werkelijk veilige manier van wachtwoordgebruik is te modern ..? Hoe lang moet iets achterhaald, verouderd, dysfunctioneel zijn voor de museumclub dat oppikt en in depot neemt, niet aan de voordeur laat staan?

Ach. En:
[Wachtwoord: MVSEVM]

Gee… DPR on Profiling

This again about that pesky new legislation that just won’t go away not even before it will be legally-effectively enforced [as you know, the thing has been around already for a year and a half, but will only be enforceable, in pure theory, per upcoming May 25th but your mileage may (huh) vary greatly – when Risk = Impact x Chance [don’t get me started on the idiocy of that, as here of 2013, Dec 5th – Gift time!] the chance is Low of Low and Impact can be easily managed down, legally yes don’t FUD me that will be the truth, the whole and nothing but it. So it will be legally effective but not in any other sense let alone practically].

For those interested, there’s this piece on Profiling. That has, on p.16 last full para (‘systems‘ that audit ..!?), p.19 3rd para from the bottom “Controllers need to introduce robust measures to verify and ensure on an ongoing basis that data reused or obtained indirectly is accurate and up to date.“, p.30 in full and many other places, pointers towards … tadaaa,

Auditing AI

with here, AI as systems that process data – as close to ‘systems’ in the cybernetic sense as one may get even when needing the full-swing wormhole-distance turn of the universe consisting not of energy but of information to abstract from the difference between info and data.

Where I am developing that auditing of AI systems as a methodologically sound thing. And do invite you to join me, and bring forward your materials and ideas on how to go about that. Yes, I do have a clue already, just not the time yet to write it all up. Will do soon [contra Fermat’s marginal remark].

Oh and then there’s the tons of materials on how anyone (incl corporate persons) will have to be able to explain in no complex terms (i.e., addressing the average or even less clever) how your AI system works…

So, inviting you, and leaving you with:
[What corks are good for, well after having preserved good wine – decoration. Recycle raw materials, don’t re-use data! Ribeauville]

Aïe! Missing the Point

Yet again, some seem to not understand what they’re talking about when it comes to transparency in AI…
Like, here. Worse, this person seems to be a rapporteur to the European Economic and Social Comittee advising the European Committee. If that sounds vague – yes it does even for Europeans.

For the ‘worse’ part: The umpteenth Error, to consider that the secrecy of algorithms is the only thing that would need to change to get transparency about the fuctioning of a complete system.
1. The algorithm is just a part of the system, and the behaviour of the system is not determined in anything close to any majority part by the algorithm – the data fed to it, and the intransparent patterns learned by it, are. The transparency needs to be about the algorithm but much more about the eventual parameters as learned throughout the training time and the training/tuning after that. [Update before press release: There seems to be an erroneous assumption by some way too deep into EC affairs that the parameters are part of the ‘algorithm’ which is Newspeak at its worst, and counterproductive certainly here, and hence dangerous.]
2. The algorithm can just be printed out … If anyone would need that. One can just as easily run an AI code analyser (how good would that be? They exist already, exponentially increasing their quality, savvyness) over the source- or decompiled code.
3. The eventual parameters … not so much; they’re just there in a live system; unsure how well they are written out into any file or so (should be, for backup purposes – when not if AI systems will get legal personhood eventually (excepting the latter-day hoaxes re that), will a power switch-off be the same as attempted murder, and/or what would the status of a backup AI ‘person’ be ..?).
4. Bias, etc. will be in the parameters. The algorithms, mostly-almost-exclusively will be blank slates. No-one yet knows how to tackle that sufficiently robustly since even if the system is programmed (algorithm..!) to cough up parameters, the cleverer systems will know (?) how to produce innocent-looking parameters instead of the possibly culpable actual ones. Leads into this trickery by AI systems, have been demonstrated to develop (unintentionally) in actual tests.
5. How to trick AI pattern recognition systems … the newest of class breaks have just been demonstrated in practice – their theoretical viability had been proven long before – e.g., in this here piece as pointed out only yesterday [qua release; scheduled last week ;-]. Class break = systemically unrepairable … [ ? | ! ].

Let’s hope the EC could get irrelevant just that little less quickly by providing it with sound advice. Not the bumbling litlle boys’ and girls’ type of happythepreppy too-dim-wits. [Pejorative, yes, but not degrading: should, maybe not could, have known better ..!]

Oh, and:
[Already at a slight distance, it gets hazy what goes on there; from the Cathédrale]

Loss of memory

Recently, was reminded (huh) that our memories are … maybe still better than we think, compared to the systems of record that we keep outside of our heads. Maybe not in ‘integrity’ of them, but in ‘availability’ terms. Oh, there, too, some unclarity whether availability regards the quick recall, the notice-shortness of ‘at short notice’ or the long-run thing, where the recall is ‘eventually’ – under multivariate optimisation of ‘integrity’ again. How ‘accurate’ is your memory? Have ‘we’ in information management / infosec done enough definition-savvy work to drop the inaccurately (huh) and multi- interpreted ‘integrity’ in favour of ‘accuracy’ which is a thing we actually can achieve with technical means whereas the other intention oft given of data being exactly what was intended at the outset (compare ‘correct and complete’), or do I need to finish this line that has run on for far too long now …?
Or have I used waaay too many ””s ..?

Anyway, part II of the above is the realisation that integrity is a personal thing, towards one’s web of allegiances as per this and in infosec we really need to switch to accuracy, and Part I is this XKCD:

The dullness of infosec ..?

And you thought fraud detection was about bank transactions or even counterfeiting physical stuff. Boh-ring, when you read this. Takes it to another level, eh?
Which brings me to an important issue: Are we not still studying and practising infosec from the wrong angle, doing a middle-out sort of development in many directions but starting at a very mundane ‘CIA’ sort of point. Which is of course core, but there is so much to cover that some outside-onto view(point) might be beneficial. We’re in the thick of the fight, and no matter in which direction you go, when you wade through the thicket with your control measures machete, you achieve little – when you then turn around to try to clear some area in another direction, all has grown dense with state-of-the-art arms’ race bush again already.
And yes, of course one can educate, etc. in some form of hierarchical approach, top-down. But that leaves us with many, all too many that float comfortably on the canopy where the view … isn’t that great as one’s very certainly in thick fog of the monsoon rain. And nothing is being directed (ugch) deeper down. Or controlled (?). Just more, most partial world views unconnected and behaving erratically.

The e.g. in this is that link above. A tiny subset of situational scenario. Not solved pervasively, once and for all. Now think about the hugely, vastly, enormously wider scope of ‘all’ of infosec that would need to be covered to a. arrive at sub-universes of control, b. overview.

The latter remains Open.
Me not happy.

Solutions, anyone ..?

Oh, plus:
[Ah! The days when this sort of ‘defence’ was enough to conquer! Alésie of course]

Less than containerload shipping

When one would be interested to keep up with what’s happening, and where future class breaks might be, a nice intro would be this little book. Like, when virtual machines came to the fore, it was declared that this would be a solution because of course the VMs would be impenetrable. By the utterly clueless, since it was the stupidest thing possible in infosec to say that. Though it cost some time to show the real value (positive) net of the risks (that indeed showed up…). With this subject, the same will happen. Future fact.

Oh and the post title just refers to shipping single pallets across the big pond, e.g., for these. Groupage, degroupage, forwarders, stewards, you know. The old, still there. And:
[Pro question: Beaune or Dyon ..?]